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Introduction 
 
The ageing of the world population is an ineluctable process. It is anticipated (United Nations 
2004) that by 2050, one in four people will be aged above 65 at the world level. This pattern 
reflects both rising longevity and declining fertility rates over the long term, as well as the 
exceptional size of the post war “baby boom” generation. Such future trends will have major 
macroeconomic consequences. 
 
The economic literature on demographics is in our view unbalanced. The link between 
changing demographic structure and conjunctural trends at a macroeconomic level has been 
widely studied; see for example Turner et al (1998), Kohl and O’Brien (1998), McMorrow 
and Roeger (2003) and Batini et al (2006). There is also an extensive literature of the impact 
of ageing on pension systems and public finance, see Dang et al (2001) and McMorrow and 
Roeger (2002) for recent examples. US researchers have put a considerable focus on links of 
demographic trends to financial asset prices (see Poterba (2004) for a recent survey, also 
Davis and Li (2003) and Brooks (2006)). There has also been work on demographic impacts 
on saving (see the review in Bosworth et al 2004). However, there has been more limited 
systematic research into the impact of demographic changes on individual financial asset 
volumes and financial market structure more generally. 
 
Accordingly, in this paper we seek to fill the gap by reviewing the literature and undertaking 
further investigation of the link of demographics to financial market structure2. The paper is 
structured as follows. After assessing a number of stylised facts in financial structure, we 
attempt to address the issue of the impact of ageing on a number of levels.  
 
Firstly we use a priori economic reasoning in terms of the life cycle theory of saving, bearing 
in mind likely developments in ageing. Secondly we review the existing literature on 
demographics and saving, financial asset demand and asset prices (including the possible 
effect of pension funding) to assess likely changes. Thirdly, we seek to assess econometrically 
using cross-country data for up to 72 countries the impact of ageing on existing financial 
systems in terms of volume of assets as well as private saving over the last 40 or so years. 
                                                 
2  Financial market structure can be viewed from several angles, namely in terms of overall size, by 
institutional sectors (e.g. household, corporate, banks, institutional investors), and by instrument (e.g. bonds, 
equities and deposits) as well as on a domestic and international level. A complication is that detailed “national-
balance-sheet” data on all of these aspects is only available for a small number of OECD countries. However, a 
wider range of countries is covered by the World Bank financial structure database (2003), notably in terms of 
volumes of equities, bonds and bank assets that we utilise here. 
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This assessment employs the World Bank financial structure database, for both OECD 
countries and emerging market economies (EMEs). We seek to control for a number of 
factors affecting financial structure (such as pension systems and level of economic 
development) in detecting an effect of demographics without “omitted variables bias”. In a 
final section, we estimate equations for demographic effects on external balances using our 
panel dataset. Policy aspects are highlighted in the conclusion. 
 
1 The evolution of financial systems 
 
As background to assessing ageing’s impact, it is essential to consider how financial 
structures evolve as countries develop, and factors that influence such development. It is 
important to understand what such normal financial development entails so we do not mistake 
it for an effect of demographic developments, perhaps due to omitting key variables from the 
econometric specification. 
 
There is a widespread perception, backed by empirical observation that financial systems go 
through stages of development. For example, Rybczinski (1997) suggests that one can 
distinguish a bank, market and securitised phase. In the bank phase all finance is directed 
through banks, whereas securities markets and institutional investors start to develop in the 
market phase and become dominant in the securitised phase. Most EMEs are still in the bank-
oriented phase, although the most advanced such as Korea are moving to a market-oriented 
phase (Davis 2005). Advanced countries are either in the market or securitised phase (where 
“securitised” implies a growing importance of securities finance generally rather than just 
packaging of loans in the form of securities). 
 
Stylised facts drawn from empirical observation suggest a somewhat more complex pattern 
(see Allen and Gale 2000), although the idea of phases remains helpful. On average, as shown 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000), banks, nonbanks and stock markets are larger, more 
active and more efficient in richer countries. This is confirmed by background data on 
financial structure that we provide in Tables 1 and 2 for EMEs and advanced countries, 
respectively. Table 1 shows that for EMEs on average, private credit amounts to the 
equivalent of 46% of GDP, while stock markets are 44% of GDP, private bonds 16% and 
public bond stocks are 25%. In contrast, in advanced countries (Table 2) the private credit 
ratio is 118% of GDP, stock market capitalisation 72%, and both private and public bond 
markets have around 50% of GDP outstanding. 
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A further division is between countries at a similar level of development that are market 
oriented and bank dominated (see Table 3). Underlying the relative importance of markets 
and banks are aspects relating to the role of public information in markets as opposed to 
private information held by banks, as well as banks’ role in corporate governance. The classic 
distinction is between the US and UK on the one hand and most Continental European 
countries and Japan on the other. In this context, advanced countries are themselves bimodal 
in their financial structure, with the market-oriented Anglo Saxon countries having larger than 
average securities markets and bank-dominated countries having dominant banking sectors.  
 
Country status in terms of bank or market focus may be partly endogenous; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2000) show that in advanced countries, stock markets become more active and 
efficient relative to banks, and there is some tendency for financial systems to become more 
market oriented as the countries become richer. On the other hand, Schmidt et al (1999, 2001) 
argue that there is path dependence, meaning that a bank based system such as Germany will 
not automatically develop into a market based system, owing to the institutional and legal 
structure that in a sense cements the bank based structure in place. 
 
A role for legal traditions in financial development and its link to market or bank orientation 
has been considered by recent empirical work on law and finance. This aspect appears to 
affect the relative size of banks and securities markets separate from the stage of economic 
development. A classification of countries by legal origin is also given in Table 3 (source: 
Impavido et al 2003). La Porta et al (1999) show that countries with a Common Law tradition, 
protection of shareholders’ rights, detailed accounting, low corruption and no explicit deposit 
insurance tend to be market based – and have large institutional investor sectors - whatever 
their income level. In contrast, countries with a French Civil Law tradition, poor protection of 
the rights of shareholders and creditors, poor contract enforcement and accounting standards, 
restrictive banking regulation, high corruption and inflation tend to have underdeveloped 
banks and markets – and institutional investors. The few countries with a German law 
tradition, which offers strong protection for creditors, tend to have strong bank based systems, 
with small institutional investor sectors. 
 
As regards historical trends, Rajan and Zingales (2000) show that financial development has 
not been monotonic. The major OECD countries were on some measures more financially 
developed in 1913 than 1980, and a significant reversal in financial development and financial 
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integration took place between 1913 and 1950. A tightening of regulation in the interwar 
period led to a decline in the size and importance of the financial sector relative to GDP. The 
imposition of such “structural regulation” implied that the service provided to the non-
financial sector was sub optimal, and economic growth was hindered, with for example low 
deposit rates and rationing of credit to households and small companies. This illustrates the 
danger of complacency by lawmakers in respect of financial development. Meanwhile, 
financial liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s has of course tended to improve financial-
sector efficiency in securities and banking, also leading to increased household borrowing, 
implying a cost in terms of risk.  
 
With this section as background we now turn to an assessment of the impact of ageing on 
financial structure. 
 
2 The likely impact of ageing on total financial assets 
 
The main focus of ageing has to be on the relation between ageing and financial asset demand 
for the personal sector since they are the ultimate holders of financial claims, if one abstracts 
from foreign claims. Theory suggesting a link between an individual’s age, consumption and 
saving decisions originated with the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957), and the 
later life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and Ando and Modigliani 
(1963)). For an overview see Deaton (1992). Saving patterns will in turn affect the aggregate 
size of the financial system, albeit also being affected by features such as the presence of pay-
as-you-go pension systems. 
 
The permanent income hypothesis, while not explicitly basing saving and consumption on 
age, has the insight that an individual’s consumption is likely to depend on permanent rather 
than current disposable income. People will only consume if they believe their income is 
sustainable. Consequently, if increases in their income are expected to be temporary, they will 
save rather then increase their consumption. The underlying assumption is that people seek to 
avoid fluctuations in their consumption when income fluctuates. Furthermore, when actual 
income is below permanent, i.e. in retirement, they may decumulate. 
 
Following this insight, the life cycle theory of consumption suggests that early in one’s life, 
consumption may well exceed income as individuals may be making major purchases related 
to buying a new home, starting a family, and beginning a career. At this stage in life, 
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individuals may borrow based on their expected labour income in the future (human wealth), 
if financial markets are sufficiently developed and liberalised. In mid-life, these expenditures 
begin to level off while labour income increases. Individuals at this point will repay debts and 
start to save for retirement in equities, bonds, pension schemes, etc. At retirement, income 
normally decreases, and individuals may start to dis-save. This involves selling off some of 
their financial assets, including pension fund decumulation.  
 
Both theories of optimal consumption imply consumption will be smoothed out through an 
individual’s lifetime, with corresponding accumulation of financial assets. In the context of 
ageing, the life cycle is a crucial background as it implies that personal saving will rise when 
the high saving group grows, then fall as the population ages, and a larger proportion of 
individuals enter the low- or negative-saving age groups. 
 
As regards empirical evidence, at a macroeconomic time series level, Disney (1996) noted 
that, consistent with the life cycle, saving rates tend to decline in countries where there are a 
larger number of retired people. The changes in savings lead to changes in demand for 
financial assets. Econometrically, a strong effect of demographics on private saving is found 
by many studies. Pioneering work in this area was by Fair and Dominguez (1991); Attfield 
and Cannon (2003) apply their work to the UK using a vector-error-correction approach. 
Masson et al (1995) found the total dependency ratio to have a significant negative effect on 
private saving in a panel of both advanced and developing countries, with an elasticity of -1. 
later work by and Loayza et al (2001) reduced this estimate to around -0.2. McMorrow and 
Roeger (2003) found an average elasticity of –0.75 across existing studies. 
 
Modigliani (1986) shows life-cycle savings follow a hump shaped pattern where an investor’s 
asset holdings increase with age and decline after retirement. Higgins (1998) sought to 
estimate demographic effects via a third order polynomial in age and found strong 
demographic effects; a similar exercise by Bosworth and Keys (2004) found a peak impact on 
saving at 40-55 and a negative effect of cohorts over 70. Al-Eyd et al (2006) tested for 
demographic effects on consumption over and above the standard determinants (i.e. income 
and wealth), using the age cohorts 20-39, 40-64 and 65+ relative to the population in 15 
countries (EU excluding Luxembourg plus US). They found a strong positive effect on 
consumption from the 20-39 cohort, but no differential between the middle aged and elderly 
as would be expected if the latter draw down savings to pay for retirement. This in turn may 
link to pay-as-you-go pension schemes in most of Europe. 
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Whereas the above work focuses on time series macroeconomic data, there is also a large 
literature on life cycle household saving using cross-sectional survey data, notably in the US 
(see the survey in Bosworth et al (2004)). A significant number of these studies have found 
that the retired cohorts do not have negative saving. There is an apparent contradiction 
between micro and macro evidence which would affect strongly the predictions about 
personal saving when ageing and asset accumulation takes place.  
 
Poterba (1998) suggests the life cycle hypothesis cannot be proven by focus on average cross-
section based asset accumulation profiles. First, average figures are distorted by the wealthiest 
10 percent of households who hold approximately 70 percent of financial assets. If equities 
are included, this will raise the number to 90 percent, see Poterba and Samwick (1997). 
Second, micro data typically omit social security wealth and wealth in defined benefit pension 
funds, which are important aspects of asset accumulation and decumulation from the point of 
view of individual households. Third, there is a problem in using cross-section data to 
evaluate the life cycle hypothesis or project asset demands, in the style of Yoo (1994) and 
Bergantino (1998) since they mix age and cohort effects, as discussed by Poterba (2001). The 
associated problems can be described using equation (1) where A αt is individual asset 
holdings of age α  at time t : 
 
Aαt = αa + βt + δt-a          (1) 
 
αa is the age-specific asset demand at age a. βt is the time-period-specific shift in asset 
demand and δt-a is the cohort-specific effort for asset demand for those born in the period t-a. 
‘Cohorts’ are a linear combination of age and time. With panel or repeated cross-section data, 
it is possible to estimate two effects, but it is impossible to estimate all three effects.  
 
Poterba and Samwick (2001) estimated the effects of ageing using the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances data allowing for this critique. They found the hump shape for net worth 
but not for net financial assets, which level off in old age. The levelling off of net financial 
assets could link to precautionary saving or a bequest motive (Hurd (1990), Bernheim 
(1991)). On the other hand, Bosworth et al (2004) suggest there may be intergenerational 
interactions missed by even such micro studies, and problems of heterogeneity leading to 
difficulty in aggregating micro studies. 
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Whereas our main focus is on personal saving and related accumulation of financial assets, it 
is important to add that as the population ages, the public sector will tend to lower its saving, 
ceteris paribus. This will in turn help to drive external balances as discussed in Section 8. 
Such trends in public saving are largely driven by the scale of the public pension system in 
the light of ageing and the means of financing adopted (e.g. taxation versus debt finance). 
Recent estimates include those in Dang et al (2001) and McMorrow and Roeger (2002). Debt 
finance would imply a greater fall in public saving. Rapid increases in the proportion of the 
population over 65 (the dependency ratio) combined with generous social security pension 
schemes are particularly threatening. It is this aspect which is encouraging governments to 
scale down public pension commitments and switch to funding. 
 
3 The likely impact of ageing on demand for financial assets 
 
While the life cycle hypothesis focuses on overall household asset demand, empirical 
evidence also suggests households’ desired portfolios of specific asset classes would vary 
with age, which in turn would have a major effect on financial structure. Hence, further work 
has related to the changing demand for financial assets over the lifecycle. One underlying 
aspect of this relates to implications for asset holding of the lifecycle pattern of borrowing and 
repayment, as well as pension accumulation. Another aspect of the underlying theoretical 
view is that risk aversion may vary over the life cycle, with individuals seeking lower risk late 
in the life cycle (i.e. shifting from equities to bonds). Complementing this, the duration of 
assets would appropriately change over the life cycle, with long duration assets such as 
equities being more appropriate for young workers saving for pension claims far in the future, 
and shorter duration assets such as bonds being more relevant for older workers (Blake 1997). 
This would be particularly the case when pensions in payment are annuities, which are 
generally backed by bonds. Note that such effects relate on the one hand to directly-held 
assets but on the other to assets held indirectly via pension funds. They may be partly offset 
if, as in many EMEs, households are multigenerational, with labour income from younger 
households in effect supporting pensioners. 
 
Bergantino (1998), looking at cross sections derived from the US Survey of Consumer 
Finances, found young households under 40 usually draw credit from the financial markets 
via taking out mortgages for buying houses. Bergantino showed that households aged 40–60 
tend to provide credit to financial markets, via employer and personal pension accounts. 
Those households which are over the age of 60 tend to withdraw from the financial markets as 
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a result of using accumulated assets to fund consumption at retirement. Mankiw and Weil 
(1989) found housing demand is high for those aged 25-40. Thus, again, their borrowings 
tend to exceed their purchases of financial assets.  
 
Goyal (2001), using aggregate stock market data, looked at the effect of cohort size on 
outflows from the US equity market, defined as the difference between the value weighted 
stock market return (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) including dividends and the percentage 
increase in stock market capitalisation. He found that outflows are related to a rise in the size 
of the cohort aged 65 and over, and inflows are linked to the size of the cohort aged 45-64, 
suggesting that a rise in the over-65 cohort will reduce the net supply of equity finance. 
 
Yoo (1994) using survey data found demand for risky assets, bonds and equities increases 
with age and decreases after individuals retire.  Bergantino (1998) showed that households 
with heads under the age of 35 generally have near zero ownership of bonds and stocks. 
However he found a divergence in stock and bond holding of older households. Ownership of 
stocks for those over 55 tends to decrease more rapidly than for bonds. He attributes this to 
possible cohort effects and risk aversion. It is also noteworthy that financial assets make up 
only 37% of household’s total assets, of which 15% are held directly in stocks. Thus, total 
household assets are mostly non-financial assets, e.g. primary residences and vehicles which 
are not the focus of our current work. 
 
These estimates are subject to the critique pointed out above of mixing cohort and age effects 
for estimates of the life cycle based on cross sectional data. On the other hand, Poterba (1998) 
shows that holdings of equities decline in old age even if age and cohort effects are allowed 
for. Ameriks and Zeldes (2000), who also correct for age and cohort effects using data from 
the US pension fund TIAA-CREF noted a rapid increase in the proportion of household 
owning equities, from 33% in 1989 to 49% in 1998 as the baby boom generation increased in 
size. This is consistent with high equity holding by the high-saving middle age group. But 
they also note that half of Americans do not hold any wealth in the stock market.  
 
Bodie and Crane (1997) looked at the total asset holdings of individuals both inside and 
outside retirement accounts and found that behaviour was in line with economic theory and 
the “best advice” of investment professionals. They hold a proportion of cash that declines 
with wealth and a proportion of equities that declines with age and rises with wealth. 
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Consistent with this, Brooks (2000) suggests that given the need to finance annuities, demand 
for equities would fall more than demand for bonds as the population ages. 
 
4 Impacts on financial asset prices 
 
A number of authors have sought to assess whether asset prices will also be put under 
downward pressure in coming decades by declining saving in OECD countries implicitly 
affecting the real interest rate or the risk premium. Particular focus has been put on the 
concept of a “meltdown” of equity prices when the baby boom generation retires. The 
underlying issue for the current paper is the balance between price and quantity effects of 
changing demands for financial assets. Arguably in an efficient market an excess demand for 
a certain type of financial asset will lead initially to price rises but in the longer term to 
balance sheet adjustments that entail higher issuance of associated claims. 
 
Schieber and Shoven (1994) suggest that given the correlation of ageing in OECD countries, 
and the likely decumulation of defined benefit pension fund assets, there could be widespread 
falls in asset prices, linked to high real interest rates. Supporting this, Erb et al (1997) find a 
positive correlation in the US between the fraction of the population 25-45 and 65+ to stock 
returns (i.e. a negative effect on prices), while those 45-65 have a negative effect. Looking at 
a range of OECD and EME countries, they find a positive relation of stock returns to the 
average age of the population. On the other hand Brooks (2006) using an econometric 
approach shows estimates suggesting at most a modest decline in equity prices and possibly 
no decline at all. 
 
Poterba (2001, 2004), although he acknowledges that standard models suggest that 
equilibrium returns on financial assets will vary in response to changes in population age 
structure, argues that the rapid meltdown hypothesis is inconsistent with empirical survey 
data. Consumers decumulate assets at a less rapid rate than the life cycle suggests. This is 
because the life cycle model takes no account of the bequest motive and lifetime uncertainty. 
Hence, although asset demands rose to fuel the 1990s boom, future declines will be modest. 
However, Abel (2001) using a rational expectations model, which took account of the bequest 
motive, found stock prices are still expected to fall when baby boomers retire despite high 
projected asset demands owing to shifts in the supply of capital in response to changes in its 
price. 
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Davis and Li (2003) give econometric evidence that demographics have had a significant 
impact on US, panel and aggregated international stock prices and bond yields, even in the 
presence of standard additional independent variables . As noted by Poterba (2004), the Davis 
and Li study “moves beyond most of the previous work in including control variables for non-
demographic factors that may affect asset prices, such as the rate of economic growth, the 
inflation rate, and the recent volatility of the equity market. The findings are robust to the 
inclusion of these control variables.” In this context, the 40-64 cohort has a strong positive 
influence on equity and bond prices, a support that would be removed as its share of the 
population declines.  
 
Rather few studies have looked at relative demand for different assets with ageing and their 
impact on prices. One exception is Brooks (2000) who, using a theoretical overlapping 
generations model, focuses on the relation between ageing and the demand for equities and 
bonds, and suggests that there will be excess demand for bonds and excess supply of equities 
in coming decades, with a modest decline in the returns on the retirement savings of baby 
boomers. He found that the bond yield would rise from 4.5% to 4.8% as the baby boomers 
buy equity then fall to 4.1% as they retire. 
 
Consistent with the point we made above, Neuberger (1999) argues that the increase and 
subsequent decrease in flows during ageing will be balanced by rises and falls in equity 
issues, with little effect on prices and returns. This suggests that there could nevertheless be a 
substantive impact on financial structure. 
 
5 Impacts of pension funds on financial structure 
 
As noted above, growth of pension funds is likely to accompany ageing and there is hence an 
important issue whether pension reform more broadly affects financial structure. An impact 
on saving and hence financial asset volumes separate from demography would have to rely on 
inability of the household sector to offset forced saving via pension funds (e.g. due to credit 
constraints) and also at a national level that any rise in personal saving is not offset by falling 
public saving. 
 
As reviewed in detail in Davis (2005, 2006) and Davis and Hu (2006), there is evidence that 
pension fund growth raises personal saving, but not one-to-one, as households reduce 
discretionary saving to offset growth in pension claims. Effects on saving are particularly 
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marked where credit markets are imperfect (limiting borrowing) or for lower income 
individuals who are less creditworthy or who do not have other assets to decumulate. 
Meanwhile, public dissaving may partly or wholly offset rises in personal saving at a national 
level, especially if the transition from pay-as-you go to funding is financed by debt issuance 
as opposed to higher taxes. On the other hand, Lopez Murphy and Musalem (2004) using a 
panel of 43 industrial, and developing countries find evidence suggesting that the 
accumulation of pension fund financial assets might indeed increase national saving, when 
these funds are the result of a mandatory pension program. The boost to personal saving is 
thus greater than the dissaving of the public sector due to reform. By contrast, national saving 
might be unaffected, when pension funds are the result of a public program, implemented to 
foster voluntary pension saving. 
 
Meanwhile, at the level of demand for individual financial assets, there is evidence that 
growth of pension funds accompanies equity market development (Catalan et al 2000), as 
well as entailing rises in the stock of private and public bonds (Hu 2005, Impavido et al 
2003). In terms of asset prices, pension fund growth accompanies a decreased dividend yield 
and increased price to book ratio, as well as lower equity price volatility implying a drop in 
the cost of capital (Walker and Lefort 2002). 
 
6 Econometric analysis of the impact of demographics on financial structure 
 
In light of the work cited above, in this section we undertake new tests of the hypothesis that 
ageing affects financial structure. We assess demographic impacts both for aggregates and 
also for ratios of financial assets. Data are for up to 72 countries from 1960-2002, of which 23 
are OECD countries, 36 are EMEs and 13 are transition economies3. Countries covered are 
listed in the Appendix. 
 
We use GLS panel techniques with fixed effects. We follow authors such as Walker and 
Lefort (2002) in adding extra explanatory variables such as inflation, per capita income, 
urbanisation and openness (average of import and export/GDP ratios) to estimated equations 
for financial structure and financial development, so as to avoid the possibility of omitted 
variables bias boosting the effect of the demographic variables. Openness we consider to be of 
particular interest, given it proxies the degree to which the country is integrated in the global 
                                                 
3 Data are largely from World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database. I am indebted to Yu-Wei Hu for use of the data he has collected. 
 13
economy, which may in turn impact on the effect demographics has on the domestic financial 
system.  
 
On the other hand, following Arestis et al (2004) we do not include some of the standard 
variables typically entered in cross-sectional cross country growth regressions such as years 
of schooling, as well as corruption, social capital, inequality and rule of law. We consider 
using panel data with fixed effects will capture any relevant differences in financial structure 
across countries. We estimate for all countries together, then for the EMEs and OECD 
countries separately (transition economies are included with EMEs). 
 
The dependent variables are firstly size variables, namely the bank loan/GDP ratio, M3/GDP, 
the equity capitalisation/GDP and bond market/GDP, as well as the sum of all three (overall 
size indicator). These sum to a rough total of domestic financial assets, which are held by 
households either directly or indirectly via financial institutions. Unfortunately, data on bond 
market capitalisation are not widely available, so the observations for that variable and the 
total size aggregate are limited. Note also that the equity market capitalisation variable (and to 
a lesser extent the bond market capitalisation) mix price and volume effects of ageing as the 
data do not distinguish rises in capitalisation from new issues from those due to revaluations. 
Furthermore, we do not have data on housing wealth for a wide range of countries, that may 
be an important complement and determinant of financing patterns that can vary with age. 
 
We also assess a number of financial structure ratios, namely the economy wide loan/equity 
ratio, debt (loans plus bonds)/equity and loan/securities (bonds plus equities) ratio. Following 
the point made above, the loan/equity ratio has the most observations. Finally, we consider 
two flow ratios, namely private saving/GDP and (reported in the next section) the external 
balance/GDP ratio. 
 
Table 4A records results for size variables for the full sample of up to 72 countries. In terms 
of GDP per capita it is evident that most of the variables are correlated with economic 
development – countries with higher living standards also have a larger financial sector, 
banking assets and liabilities, and equity market. Only the bond market result is opposite to 
this. Equally, urbanisation tends to accompany financial development, although the 
coefficient for equities is insignificant. Inflation is clearly inimical to bond issuance, as would 
be expected, but not to overall financial-sector size or bank loan volume. More open 
economies tend to have larger banking sectors and equity markets although the size effect is 
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insignificant. Note that the size and bond results are based on quite small samples (37 
countries and around 400 observations instead of 65 and over 1000 for the others) and hence 
may be less well determined than the bank and equity results.  
 
Turning to the demographic effects, a common feature is that the size of the over 65 cohort is 
significantly positively related to all the size variables. We need to infer causality with caution 
however, as it may link partly to the fact that countries with higher living standards have 
larger populations of pensioners. The relative size of the 40-64 and 65+ coefficients is of 
interest. For bonds, it is the over-65 cohort that is most favourable to bond market 
development, consistent with the idea of greater risk aversion of older people in work cited 
above. On the other hand, for equities it is the 40-64 cohort that is most favourable, consistent 
with higher demand for equities among those in peak years of saving for retirement. The 
coefficients for M3 and bank lending are similar for the two cohorts. Meanwhile, the 20-39 
cohort is insignificant or negative for most of the equations, consistent with low or negative 
financial saving by this cohort - but a high demand for bank loans in the form of mortgages, 
where the lending equation coefficient is positive. 
 
To check for robustness, we add two lagged financial development variables, the pension 
fund/GDP and the bank lending to the private sector/GDP ratio (right hand side of Table 4). 
Most of the existing demographic coefficients are unchanged. Especially, the bulk of the over-
65 cohort coefficients are still positive and significant, and the pattern for the 40-64 relative to 
the over-65s for equities and bonds is as cited above. The exception is that the lending 
equation has a negative sign for the younger cohorts with the extra variables. Pension funding 
is shown to entail a larger bond and equities stock, and a smaller size of the banking sector, 
but a larger financial sector overall. Bank lending to the private sector is positively related to 
size (with a smaller coefficient) while there is also, unsurprisingly, a positive relationship 
with the banking sector variables (where it is more or less a lagged dependent variable). 
 
A further robustness check was to change the specification for one where the dependent 
variable is a five-year average and the lagged variables are the “initial conditions” at the 
beginning of each 5-year period (Table 4B). We find that the demographic results are 
remarkably similar. Notably, we again find the relatively greater effect of the 65+ generation 
on bonds and the 40-64s on equities, consistent with risk aversion effects. The signs on most 
of the non financial variables are also robust. 
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As regards the size estimates for the EME countries and OECD countries (Table 5), results 
are similar despite the differing living standards and levels of financial development, which 
underpins the results for the full sample of countries. There remain some differences, 
however. For EMEs, GDP per capita is favourable for financial development except for bond 
markets, while for the OECD countries there is a negative sign for standards of living for 
equity markets, possibly reflecting high living standards in some “bank dominated” countries. 
Bond market development for OECD countries is not affected by GDP per capita, the level of 
which is of course fairly common across OECD countries. In this context, note that in OECD 
countries, the correlation between bonds and government debt is closer than in EMEs where 
much of government debt is a bank asset. 
 
Urbanisation is positive and significant for all of the EME equations, but only for total size 
for the OECD. Again, urbanisation is comparable across the OECD. Openness has a positive 
effect on financial development for both sets of countries, although the coefficient for size in 
EMEs and for size and M3 in the OECD are insignificant, and for the OECD the bond 
coefficient is negative – possibly reflecting lesser fiscal discipline in the more closed 
economies. Inflation appears to have a more frequent negative effect on financial 
development in the OECD, where it has for example a significant negative effect for bonds, 
equities and overall size. In contrast, it is positive for overall size and loans in EMEs. 
 
In terms of the demographic variables, the age 65+ cohort has a positive and significant effect 
throughout, except for equities4 where it is insignificant for both subsets of countries. This is a 
more telling result than for the full set of countries, given that the OECD and EME countries 
separately have more similar age distributions than when they are pooled together. It suggests 
that there may indeed be a positive effect of the elderly on quantities in financial markets 
other than equities, consistent with a pattern whereby they switch from equities to safe assets, 
but the decline in net financial assets is not a sizeable one for reasons of precaution or bequest 
as also suggested by Poterba and Samwick (2001)).5  
 
Consistent with this suggestion, the dichotomy of equities and bonds across the 40-64 and 
65+ cohorts again applies, with only the 40-64 coefficient being significant (and positive) for 
equities in both country groups. The bond coefficient is insignificant for the 40-64s in both 
                                                 
4 We note that the lack of significance of equities for the over-65 variable rules out the possibility that results for 
EMEs are driven by a correlation of longevity with overall development. 
5  Or course, the foreign sector may also be an important concurrent investor in these assets, notably in 
small open economies. 
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groups and significant for the 65+. Hence again, there is implied to be a relative switch by the 
elderly from equities to bonds. Meanwhile, especially for the OECD the coefficients of these 
subgroups is comparable (positive and significant) for M3 and bank lending, suggesting that 
liquid asset holding needs do not change with retirement. Meanwhile the 20-39 cohort is 
shown to have a negative impact on M3 for the OECD, but a positive effect on M3 and 
borrowing in the EMEs. The contrast for M3 may reflect greater liquidity constraints in the 
EMEs. Finally, the 20-39 cohort has a negative effect on overall size in both cases, as do the 
40-64s for EMEs. 
 
Turning to estimates for ratios (Table 6), the loan-equity equation has most countries (67) and 
observations (1219). This shows that economic development accompanies growth in 
securities markets relative to banks, as witness a negative sign on the GDP per capita and on 
urbanisation. This is consistent with a shift to market orientation as economic development 
proceeds, as discussed in Section 1. More open countries also have a larger stock of equity 
relative to bank lending, consistent with internationally integrated securities markets. Inflation 
is inimical to equities as opposed to bank lending. The demographic variables are all negative 
for this equation, but with the largest value for the 40-64 cohort, consistent with larger relative 
demand for equities rather than risk free bank liabilities for this group. Meanwhile, for the 
loan-securities ratio there are no significant demographic effects, and for the debt-equity ratio 
the younger cohorts are shown (on the smaller sample) to tend towards debt (loans and 
bonds). The equations with the financial development variables show similar patterns for the 
demographic effects. A large pension fund sector is shown to accompany a larger stock of 
equity relative to bank loans, as, interestingly, does a larger banking sector. On the other 
hand, a larger volume of bank loans to the private sector accompanies a higher loan-security 
and economy wide debt-equity ratio. 
 
Looking at the ratio results for the separate country groups (Table 7) briefly, the loan-equity 
ratio is reduced strongly in OECD countries by the high saving 40-64 cohort, who as shown 
in Table 6 direct funds to equities more than banks. In the EMEs it is the 20-39 and 65+ 
cohort that drives a fall in the loan-equity ratio – the result for all countries in Table 6 was a 
mixture of these effects. 
 
We finally highlight some results for private saving using demographic effects, as shown in 
Table 8. Note that this includes corporate as well as household saving. Given this area has 
been widely researched (see Section 5), we do not put a major emphasis on these results. 
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Nevertheless, it is notable that strong and consistent demographic effects are detected for all 
countries and both subgroups, with a range of financial structures. The results are in turn 
consistent with the life cycle hypothesis (although the results do not prove the life cycle 
pattern holds for each individual cohort, since the aggregate macro data show the average age-
behaviour of a range of cohorts). 
 
In each case the 20-39 and 40-64 cohorts are positive for private saving, and the 40-64 group 
always has a larger coefficient. In EMEs the 20-39 group is positive and significant (and also 
for all countries) but in the OECD countries, the 20-39 group is insignificant, which may 
reflect heavy borrowing in financially liberalised economies, while the 20-39s face liquidity 
constraints in EMEs. Meanwhile, the over-65 cohort has a consistently negative and 
significant impact for saving, across all country groups. The contrast with some of the 
positive results for financial asset accumulation may reflect the existing stock of wealth that 
this cohort has built up, and positive revaluations that will not be reflected in private sector 
saving. Finally, whereas the pension sector has no effect on private saving, there is a tendency 
for countries with large bank lending to the private sector to have lower private saving also. 
 
Overall, we conclude from this preliminary empirical work that there are indeed detectable 
demographic effects on financial structure, that can be expected to impact in the future. Inter 
alia, there is a switch from equities to bonds between the 40-64 and 65+ cohorts, as well as a 
positive impact of the older cohorts on banking and overall size of the financial sector. Saving 
regressions show a strong positive effect for the 40-64 cohort and negative for the 65+ one, 
consistent with other work in this area. So in an ageing economy, a financial system may well 
become more bond- as opposed to equity-based, and somewhat larger overall, while also 
facing declining inflows of saving.  
 
This is an area which clearly warrants further research. Further work could assess different 
specifications, notably using lagged dependent variables for the financial structure variables, 
which would in turn necessitate using the Generalised Method of Moments method of 
estimation. 
 
7 Impacts of ageing on cross border financial claims 
 
In open economies, ageing will also impact on the external balance, depending on the path of 
investment. In this context, most studies suggest that investment rates will fall with ageing, 
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which would temper the increase in external deficits from lower saving. For example, Cutler 
et al (1990) suggest that total investment may fall with ageing, given the reduced need for 
capital widening with a smaller workforce; they also envisage a fall in the rate of return on 
capital from 6.7% in 1990 to 3.5% in 2025. Disney (1996) shows a significant negative 
relationship between the dependency ratio and fixed capital growth over 1977-92 in 24 OECD 
countries. Blommestein (1998) again sees falling investment as likely to occur as the labour 
force shrinks and the capital labour ratio rises, depressing returns to new investment. Higgins 
(1998) estimates that cohort age 15-24 has a peak positive effect on investment, earlier than 
the 30-45 found for saving. 
 
Bikker (1996) focuses directly on balance-of-payments effects of ageing and finds that the 
effects in OECD countries may be towards a surplus as long as national saving is boosted by 
ageing, which seems possible as long as the ‘baby boom’ generation remains at work. But 
once people in this generation retire and begin to dissave, there could be balance-of-payments 
problems.  
 
In the light of this work, we undertook panel estimates for the external balance, bearing in 
mind that it is a product of public as well as private sector behaviour, and of investment as 
well as saving. These are also reported in Table 8. Looking first at the non-demographic 
effects, countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have surpluses, in the full group as well 
as the EMEs and OECD countries separately. Rapid income growth tends to entail a deficit, 
but interestingly not for the OECD countries, where high inflation is a stronger indicator of 
external deficits. As regards demographic effects, the 20-39 cohort is not in any case a 
significant influence on the external position. The 40-64 cohort tends to encourage a surplus 
position, albeit not significantly for the OECD countries. This is plausible in the light of high 
saving by this group, and also a likely beneficial effect on government saving (higher tax 
receipts than expenditure needs). The 65+ generation is associated with a tendency to deficit 
in the external position in all cases, consistent with lower private saving as discussed above as 
well as pension and health expenditures by government with less offsetting tax inflows. 
Finally, whereas the pension sector has no effect on the external position, there is a tendency 
for countries with large bank lending to the private sector to have deficits also. This may of 
course reflect private investment financed by such lending, as we now go on to discuss. 
 
On balance, our results suggest that the pattern of ownership of financial claims will shift 
relatively from OECD countries towards EMEs as the former age more rapidly, although later 
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ageing of the EMEs will tend to redress the balance. These suggestions are supported by 
various macroeconomic projections as summarised below: 
 
8 Global macroeconomic projections 
 
Illustrating the overall outcome of these ageing patterns, and giving further clues about 
changes in financial structure with ageing. Turner et al (1998) provided a simulation of the 
global effects of population ageing (focusing both on changing population growth and age 
structure), using the OECD’s international dynamic general equilibrium macromodel 
MINILINK. Reflecting the declining labour supply with ageing, economic growth is forecast 
to decline to 0.25% per annum in Japan, 1% in Europe and 1.4% in the United States by 
around 2030. The slowdown in growth reduces investment needs directly. Furthermore, a 
decline in the weight of the OECD in the world economy tends to improve OECD current 
accounts (and hence saving-investment balances) as non-OECD imports rise faster than 
OECD import demand. The US, Europe and Japan all generate balance of payments surpluses 
of 2-3% of GDP up to 2025, as saving is initially boosted by the high proportion of high-
saving age groups while growth potential and hence investment weaken, thus building up net 
external assets which help to buttress GNP. They thus build up ownership of global financial 
claims, including those on EMEs. 
 
On the other hand, eventual downwards pressures on public and private saving are greater in 
the OECD than elsewhere, generating – in combination with exchange rate appreciation – 
deficits for the three OECD regions after 2025. The balance of ownership of global financial 
assets would tend to switch at this point from OECD countries to EMEs. As world investment 
in this simulation falls less than saving, world real interest rates are expected to rise slightly, 
reinforcing the decline in investment. Reflecting differing returns on capital, interest rates are 
higher in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) than in the OECD. The authors note that 
higher saving in OECD countries could generate quite different results, with lower real 
interest rates and consequently higher investment and capital-labour ratios. There would also 
be greater net external assets, boosting OECD GNP via inflows of interest, profits and 
dividends6. 
 
                                                 
6  The return on such investments will depend on factors such as labour and product market reforms in the 
EMEs as well as the overall size of such flows from the OECD (if the flows are sufficiently sizeable, they will 
depress the return on capital in the EMEs). 
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McMorrow and Roeger (2003) concur that the EU and Japan will run surpluses for some time, 
but expect the US to run ongoing deficits, reflecting growth differentials and an assumption 
that the absorptive capacity of slow ageing EMEs is limited. Their projection, unlike that of 
Turner et al (1998) thus implies that the bulk of cross-border claims will remain within the 
OECD region during ageing. They also note that such a continued concentration of capital 
flows within the OECD is more likely to generate downward pressure on rates of return and a 
risk of bubbles. 
 
Finally, Batini et al (2006) using a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model, again 
find slower growth and a current account deterioration for the advanced countries as the 
elderly run down assets in retirement. Interestingly, more rapid productivity growth (in terms 
of catch-up with the US) can markedly reduce the loss in growth from ageing7, and related 
current account imbalances. 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
Summarising the paper, we noted initially that financial structure is intimately related to the 
stage of development and legal structure of an economy. We then highlighted that, in line 
with the life cycle, overall personal saving is likely to rise then fall as ageing proceeds, thus 
impacting on the size of financial claims and overlaying standard patterns of financial 
development. Existing work also shows that ageing tends to accompany an initial shift into 
securities followed by a relative shift from equities to bonds, as well as a fall in household 
debt. There has been extensive work on securities prices and ageing, much of which suggests 
that ageing will depress equity prices, albeit modestly. Finally, most analysis suggests that 
ageing will accompany rising current account surpluses in the OECD followed by deficits, 
largely driven by changes in saving albeit also affected by demographic effects on investment. 
 
Our own empirical work suggests that demographic changes have had a detectable impact on 
financial structure in both OECD countries and EMEs and will continue to do so in future if 
current relationships continue to hold. The similar results for the two subgroups suggest that 
this may indeed be the case (as OECD countries can be viewed as akin to EMEs at a later 
stage in ageing and economic growth.) Ageing tends initially to benefit equities (as the 40-64 
cohort grows) but then as the 65+ cohort becomes predominant, it will rather benefit bond 
                                                 
7 See Davis (2006) for a review of existing work and new estimates of the age structure impact on 
productivity, as well as that of pension funding. 
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markets relative to equity markets. Banking tends to benefit from large 40-64 and 65+ 
cohorts. Finally, a rise in the 65+ cohort also tends to depress private saving and external 
balances, albeit not reducing the overall size of the financial sector. 
 
Policy-relevant issues, also necessitating further research that are raised by the effect of 
ageing on financial market structure include the following: 
 
• What will be the balance between price and quantity effects on financial markets as 
the asset-demands of the household sector evolve with ageing? If there is a 
“meltdown” will there be pressure on governments to accept some of the burden of 
adjustment, notably in the concept of defined contribution pension funds? 
 
• How should government financing evolve to meet the changing demands of the 
household sector in terms of asset-risk? Should they issue bonds linked to longevity to 
overcome uncertainty over demographic changes? 
 
• How will companies cope with the changing demand for bonds and equities from the 
household sector during ageing? Will there be an initial fall in debt-equity ratios 
followed by a rise – leading to heightened bankruptcy risk at a time when economic 
growth may also be sluggish? Or could asynchronous demand for bonds and equities 
by OECD and EME households flatten out this pattern? 
 
• Saving has seen a decline in many advanced countries after financial liberalisation, as 
household sectors have undertaken heavy borrowing and relied on asset prices 
(notably house prices) to maintain wealth/income ratios. Can this continue as the 
population ages, and how will ageing, borrowing and house prices interact? 
 
• Is it plausible that banking sectors will be relatively unaffected by ageing, as implied 
by the empirical results? 
 
• Will there be difficulties in dealing with major cross border flows, initially from 
OECD countries to EMEs and later reversed, which are also likely to drive shifts in 
exchange rates and even financial instability (Davis 2002). Why are such flows not 
occurring now – but rather it is EMEs that are financing the OECD via foreign 
exchange  reserves? Can EMEs absorb the potential volume of OECD claims in the 
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short term (cf. McMorrow and Roeger (2003) cited above) – and what are the 
economic and political implications of major shifts later by EMEs into creditor status, 
when economic development is much more comparable than it is now? Will cross 
border EME asset demand help attenuate any pressures cited above for changes in 
asset prices and composition of assets in OECD countries?  
 
• How should financial regulation adapt to the changing patterns of financial stocks and 
flows foreshadowed in this work? 
 
• Interaction of changing structure of finance with growth in conjunction with ageing, 
given that there is an extensive literature on finance and growth (see Beck and Levine 
(2004) and Davis and Hu (2004) for example), while there is also emerging evidence 
that ageing may affect growth (such as Davis (2006) who looks at a possible impact 
on total factor productivity). 
 
• Will past patterns, which were estimated over periods when pension systems were 
more pay-as-you-go based, change as pension funding becomes more important? Will 
the switch from defined benefit to defined contribution pension funds change saving, 
and its composition between debt and equity claims (e.g. as risk bearing households 
under defined contribution become more cautious)? 
 
REFERENCES 
Abel, A B. (2001). “Will Bequests Attenuate the Predicted Meltdown in Stock Prices When Baby Boomers 
Retire?”. Working paper no: 01-2, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and NBER. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000), "Comparing financial systems", MIT Press. 
Ameriks Jand Zeldes, S. (2000). “How Do Households Portfolio Shares Vary with Age?”. Working paper: 
Columbia University and TIAA-CREF. 
Ando, A and F Modigliani (1963). “The ‘Life Cycle’ Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests”. 
American Economic Review, Vol 53, pp 55-84.  
Arestis, P, A. D. Luintel and K. B. Luitel; 2004; Does Financial Structure Matter? Working Paper No. 399; The 
Levy Economics Institute of Band College; New York; January.  
Attfield C and E Cannon (2003), “The impact of age distribution variables on the long run consumption 
function”, Working Paper, Bristol University 
Al-Eyd A, Barrell R and Davis E P (2006), “Determinants of European consumption - a panel approach”, 
mimeo, NIESR, London 
Batini N, T Callen and W McKibbin (2006), “The global impact of demographic change”, IMF Working Paper 
WP/06/9. 
Beck, T. and R. Levine; (2004); Stock markets, Banks and Growth; Panel Evidence; Journal of Banking and 
Finance; Vol 28; pp423-442.  
 23
Bergantino, Steven M. (1998). “Life Cycle Investment Behavior, Demographics, and Asset Prices”. PhD 
Dissertation, MIT. 
Bernheim D (1991) “How strong are bequest motives; evidence based on estimates of the demand for life 
insurance and annuities”, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 899-927 
Bikker, J. A. (1996) “National savings, the current account and ageing populations, a pension fund model”, 
Economic and Financial Modelling, Summer 1996, 1-20. 
Blake, D.; (1997); Pension Funds and Capital Market; Discussion Paper PI-9706; The Pension Institute, City 
University, London. 
Blommestein H (1998), “Ageing induced capital flows to emerging markets do not solve the OECD’s basic 
pension problem”, in eds H Blommestein and N Funke, “Institutional investors in the new financial landscape”, 
OECD, Paris. 
Bodie Z and Crane D B (1997), “Personal investing: advice, theory and evidence”, Financial Analysts Journal, 
November/December, 13-23 
Boersch-Supan A and Winter J (2002), “Ageing and international capital flows”, in eds H Herrmann and A 
Auerbach, “Ageing and Financial Markets”, Springer Verlag – Deutsche Bundesbank 
Bosworth B, Bryant R and Burtless G (2004), “The impact of ageing on financial markets and the economy; a 
survey”, mimeo, The Brookings Institution 
Brooks, R (1998). “Asset Markets and Savings Effects of Demographic Transitions”. Doctoral Dissertation, Yale 
University, Department of Economics. 
Brooks, R (2000). “What Will Happen to Financial Markets When the Baby Boomers Retire?”. IMF Working 
Paper: WP/00/18. 
Brooks, R (2006). “Demographic change and asset prices”. Paper presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia – 
G20 conference on “Demographics and Financial Markets”, Sydney, July 2006 
Catalan, M., G. Impavido and A. R. Musalem; (2000); Contractual savings or stock market development: which 
leads? Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0020; The World Bank.  
Cutler, D., Poterba, J., Sheiner, L. and Summers, L. (1990), ‘An aging society, opportunity or challenge?’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-56. 
Dang T T, Antolin P and Oxley H (2001), “Fiscal implications of ageing; projections of age-related spending”, 
Economics Department Working Paper No 305, OECD, Paris 
Davis E P (2002), “Ageing and financial stability”, in eds H Herrmann and A Auerbach, “Ageing and Financial 
Markets”, Springer Verlag – Deutsche Bundesbank 
Davis E P (2005), “The Role Of Pension Funds As Institutional Investors In Emerging Markets”, Brunel 
University Working Paper 05-18 
Davis E P (2006), “Pension funding, productivity and economic growth”, paper to be presented at the Deutsche 
Bundesbank Summer Conference, July 2006. 
Davis E P and Hu Y (2004), “Is there any link between pension fund assets and economic growth? – A cross-
country study”, Economics and Finance Working Paper No 04-23, Brunel University. 
Davis E. P. and Hu, Y. (2006). “Saving, funding and economic growth” in G. L. Clark, A. Munnell and M. 
Orszag (eds.), “Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income”, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Davis E P and Li C (2003), “Demographics and financial asset prices in the major industrial economies”, Brunel 
University Working Paper No 03-07 
Deaton, A.S. (1992). Understanding Consumption, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Demirguc Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2000), “Bank-based and market-based financial systems; cross-country 
comparisons”, paper presented at the World Bank conference on “Financial structure and economic 
development”, 10-11 February 2000. 
Disney R. (1996) “Can we afford to grow older?”, MIT Press 
Erb, C,  B Harvey, Campbell R. and Viskanta Tadas E. (1997). “Demographics and International Investments”. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 14-28 
Friedman, M (1957). “A Theory of the Consumption Function”. Princeton University Press. 
 24
Goyal, A (2001). “Demographics, Stock Market Flows, and Stock Returns”. Working Paper: Anderson Graduate 
School of Management, UCLA. 
Higgins M (1998), “Demography, national saving and international capital flows”, International Economic 
Review, 39/3, 43-69 
Holzmann R (2000), “Can investment in emerging markets help to solve the ageing problem?”, Social Protection 
Discussion Paper No 0010, the World Bank 
Hu Y (2005), “Pension Reform, Economic Growth and Financial Development- An Empirical Study”, 
Economics and Finance Working Paper No 05-05, Brunel University. 
Hurd, M D. (1987). “Savings of the Elderly and Desired Bequests”. The American Economic Review. June, pp 
299-312. 
Impavido, G., A. R. Musalem and T. Tressel; (2003); The Impact of Contractual Savings Institutions on 
Securities Markets; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2948; January. The World Bank.   
Kohl, R and O’Brien P (1998). “The Macroeconomics of Ageing, Pensions and Savings: A Survey”. OECD, 
paper: AWP 1.1. 
La Porta R, Lopez-Silanes F and Schleifer A (1999), “Corporate ownership around the world”, Journal of 
Finance, 54, 471-517 
Levine, R. (2000), “Bank based or market based financial systems – which is better?”, paper presented at the 
World Bank conference on “Financial structure and economic development”, 10-11 February 2000. 
Loayza N, Schmidt-Hebbel K and Serven L (2000), “What drives private savings around the world?”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 82 
Musalem, A R.; Lopez Murphy, P (2004), “Pension funds and national saving”, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 3410, The World Bank. 
Mankiw, G N. and Weil, D N. (1989). “The Baby Boom, The Baby Bust and the Housing Market”. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, vol: 19, pp 235-258. 
Masson, P., Bayoumi, T. and Samiei, H. (1995), ‘International evidence on the determinants of private saving’, 
IMF Working Paper No. W95/51 
McMorrow K and Roeger W (2002), “EU pension reform, an overview of the debate and an empirical 
assessment of the main policy reform options”, European Economy Economic Papers No 162, European 
Commission, Brussels 
McMorrow K and Roeger W (2003), “Economic and financial market consequences of ageing populations”, 
European Economy Economic Papers No 182, European Commission, Brussels 
Modigliani, F. (1986). “Life cycle, individual thrift, and the wealth of nations”. American Economic Review, 
vol: 76, pp 297-312. 
Modigliani, F and Brumberg, R (1954). “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of 
Cross-Section Data”, in K. Kurihara, ed.: Post-Keynesian Economics. Rutgers University Press. 
Neuberger A. 1999. “Long term savings flows and the capital market”, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Global 
Pensions Quarterly, January 1999 
Poterba, J. (1998). “Population Age Structure and Asset Returns: An Empirical Investigation”. NBER Working 
Paper 6774. 
Poterba, J. (2001). “Demographic Structure and Asset Returns”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 83, 565-
584 
Poterba J (2004), “The impact of population ageing on financial markets”, NBER Working Paper No. 10851 
Poterba, J. and Samwick, A. (1995). “Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations, and Consumption”. 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, vol:2, pp 295-371. 
Poterba, J and Samwick, A. (2001). “Household Portfolio Allocation Over the Life Cycle”. In S Ogura, T 
Tachibanaki, and D Wise (eds), “Aging issues in the US and Japan”, University of Chicago Press 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, (2000), “The great reversals; the politics of financial development in the 20th century”, 
Working paper No 265, Economics Department, OECD 
Schieber, S. J. and Shoven, J. B. (1994) “The Consequences of Population Aging on Private Pension Fund 
Saving and Asset Markets”. NBER Working Paper 4665.  
 25
Schmidt, R.H., Hackethal, A. and Tyrell, M. (1999), “Disintermediation and the role of banks in Europe, an 
international comparison”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8, 36-67. 
Schmidt, R.H., Hackethal,A. and Tyrell,M. (2001), “The convergence of financial systems in Europe, main 
findings of the DFG project”, University of Frankfurt. 
Turner D, Giorno C, De Serres A, Vourch A and Richardson P. 1998. “The macroeconomic implications of 
ageing in a global context”, Economics Department Working Paper No 193, OECD, Paris 
United Nations (2004), “Demographic data 2004”, UN, New York 
Walker, E. and F. Lefort; (2002); Pension reform and capital markets: are there any (hard) links? Social 
Protection discussion paper No. 0201; January; The World Bank. 
World Bank (2003), “Financial Structure Database”, IBRD, Washington DC 
Yoo, P. (1994). “Age Dependent Portfolio Selection”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Working Paper 94-
003A. 
 
 26
Table 1. Financial structure within EMEs (as of 2003) 
 
Country Name 
Private credit 
by deposit 
money banks 
and other 
financial 
institutions to 
GDP 
Concentration Net Interest Margin 
Stock market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Private bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Public bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Argentina 0.118 0.468 0.052 0.624 0.100 0.056 
Bulgaria 0.224 0.468 0.044 0.063 n.a. n.a. 
Bolivia 0.486 0.511 0.056 0.173 n.a. n.a. 
Brazil 0.332 0.467 0.120 0.362 0.097 0.426 
Chile 0.750 0.591 0.051 0.864 0.194 0.274 
Colombia 0.227 0.379 0.061 0.150 0.003 0.253 
Costa Rica 0.287 0.591 0.081 0.111 n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 0.295 0.702 0.020 0.183 0.072 0.515 
Dominican Republic 0.354 0.716 0.139 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ecuador 0.245 0.695 0.074 0.073 n.a. n.a. 
Estonia 0.292 0.982 0.036 0.021 n.a. n.a. 
Fiji n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.342 n.a. n.a. 
Hong Kong, China 1.519 0.703 0.027 3.733 0.189 0.097 
Honduras 0.380 0.489 0.081 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 0.378 0.540 0.056 0.174 0.034 0.409 
Indonesia 0.219 0.534 0.048 0.204 n.a. n.a. 
Kazakhstan 0.189 0.632 0.057 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Korea, Rep. 1.199 0.478 0.027 0.479 0.504 0.183 
Sri Lanka 0.276 0.683 0.037 0.119 n.a. n.a. 
Mexico 0.181 0.590 0.068 0.181 0.025 0.203 
Malaysia 1.327 0.429 0.025 1.414 0.530 0.363 
Pakistan 0.270 0.551 0.033 0.190 n.a. n.a. 
Panama n.a. 0.347 0.029 0.235 n.a. n.a. 
Peru 0.213 0.820 0.100 0.244 0.038 0.035 
Philippines 0.349 0.430 0.033 0.396 0.001 0.280 
Poland 0.281 0.419 0.040 0.153 n.a. 0.291 
Russian Federation n.a. 0.225 0.057 0.411 n.a. 0.020 
Singapore 1.132 0.964 0.012 1.360 0.231 0.389 
Slovak Republic 0.350 0.674 0.034 0.071 n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 0.392 0.606 0.032 0.207 n.a. n.a. 
Thailand 0.957 0.522 0.026 0.564 0.156 0.210 
Ukraine 0.197 0.490 0.053 0.075 n.a. n.a. 
Uruguay 0.503 0.661 0.066 0.017 n.a. n.a. 
Average 0.464 0.574 0.052 0.440 0.155 0.250 
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Table 2: Financial structure within advanced countries (as of 2003) 
 
Country Name 
Private credit 
by deposit 
money banks 
and other 
financial 
institutions to 
GDP 
Concentration Net Interest Margin 
Stock market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Private bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Public bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Australia 0.953 0.664 0.021 0.937 0.341 0.156 
Austria 1.037 0.798 0.021 0.172 0.368 0.373 
Belgium 0.757 0.830 0.022 0.501 0.394 0.971 
Canada 0.989 0.543 0.027 0.885 0.214 0.561 
Switzerland 1.559 0.903 0.015 2.080 0.403 0.287 
Germany 1.174 0.637 0.030 0.370 0.426 0.378 
Denmark 1.483 0.852 0.038 0.485 1.193 0.481 
Spain 1.113 0.729 0.028 0.714 0.240 0.445 
United Kingdom 1.413 0.427 0.028 1.199 0.389 0.276 
Iceland 1.000 0.975 0.021 0.748 1.326 0.158 
Italy 0.825 0.405 0.026 0.375 0.439 0.847 
Japan 1.046 0.331 0.017 0.601 0.444 1.207 
Netherlands 1.515 0.833 0.018 0.876 0.566 0.446 
Norway 0.952 0.919 0.021 0.368 0.242 0.173 
New Zealand 1.136 0.608 0.024 0.361 n.a. 0.278 
Portugal 1.476 0.838 0.034 0.340 0.282 0.464 
Sweden 1.022 0.967 0.031 0.776 0.401 0.411 
United States 1.736 0.311 0.039 1.175 1.126 0.443 
Average 1.177 0.698 0.026 0.720 0.517 0.464 
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Table 3: Characteristics of financial systems  
 
country Legal 
origin 
Bank-
based 
Market-
based 
Low 
developed 
Antidirector 
rights 
Argentina F 0 0 1 (B) 4 
Australia CL 0 1 0 4 
Austria G 1 0 0 2 
Belgium F 1 0 0 0 
Brazil F 0 0 1 (M) 3 
Canada CL 0 1 0 5 
Chile F 0 0 1 (C) 5 
Denmark SC 0 0 1 (M) 2 
Finland SC 1 0 0 3 
France F 1 0 0 3 
Germany G 1 0 0 1 
Greece F 0 0 1 (B) 2 
Hungary G 0 0 1 (.) 3 
India CL 0 0 1 (B) 5 
Ireland CL 0 0 1 (B) 4 
Italy F 1 0 0 1 
Japan G 1 0 0 4 
Korea (South) G 0 1 0 2 
Malaysia CL 0 1 0 3 
Mexico F 0 0 1 (M) 1 
Netherlands F 0 1 0 2 
New Zealand CL 1 0 0 4 
Norway SC 1 0 0 4 
Portugal F 1 0 0 3 
Singapore CL 0 1 0 4 
South Africa CL 0 1 0 5 
Spain F 1 0 0 4 
Sri Lanka CL 0 0 1 (B) 3 
Sweden SC 0 1 0 3 
Switzerland G 0 1 0 2 
Thailand F 0 1 0 2 
Turkey F 0 0 1 (M) 2 
United Kingdom CL 0 1 0 5 
United States CL 0 1 0 5 
 
Source, Impavido et al (2003). Key: F: French Origin, G: German Origin, SC: Scandinavian Origin, CL: Common Law 
B : Bank-based, M: Market-based financial systems 
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Table 4A: Estimates of demographic effects on financial structure (size variables) – all countries 
 
 All countries All countries with financial development variables 
% of 
GDP 
Size Loans M3 Equities Bonds Size Loans M3 Equities Bonds 
GDPPC 0.099 
(7.8) 
0.0176 
(11.5) 
0.003 
(2.4) 
0.0084 
(2.1) 
-0.0058 
(1.8) 
0.079 
(5.5) 
0.0072 
(5.2) 
-0.0046 
(3.3) 
0.0038 
(0.8) 
-0.005 
(1.3) 
INFLA
TION 
0.018 
(2.0) 
0.0031 
(2.6) 
0.00031 
(0.4) 
-0.002 
(0.6) 
-0.0059 
(2.5) 
0.0074 
(0.9) 
0.00006 
(0.1) 
-
0.00072 
(1.2) 
-0.0019 
(0.6) 
-0.0063 
(2.7) 
URBA
N 
0.048 
(4.2) 
0.0014 
(1.6) 
0.0038 
(6.0) 
0.0017 
(0.6) 
0.0012 
(2.4) 
0.0081 
(0.6) 
0.0024 
(3.4) 
0.0036 
(5.6) 
-0.0001 
(0.1) 
-0.0069 
(2.1) 
OPEN 0.0025 
(0.7) 
0.0053 
(8.4) 
0.0044 
(10.3) 
0.0092 
(6.8) 
0.0014 
(1.6) 
0.0045 
(1.4) 
-0.0014 
(2.8) 
0.0006 
(1.5) 
0.0094 
(6.1) 
0.0026 
(3.0) 
20-39 -0.093 
(4.1) 
0.0056 
(2.7) 
0.0014 
(1.0) 
-0.0063 
(1.0) 
-0.0062 
(1.1) 
-0.06 
(2.6) 
-0.0014 
(2.8) 
0.00004 
(0.1) 
-0.0002 
(0.1) 
0.0072 
(1.2) 
40-64 -0.036 
(1.5) 
0.021 
(7.7) 
0.025 
(14.2) 
0.064 
(8.5) 
0.014 
(2.3) 
-0.037 
(6.3) 
-0.0059 
(2.5) 
0.012 
(6.1) 
0.048 
(5.6) 
0.018 
(2.6) 
65 +  0.156 
(5.2) 
0.039 
(8.4) 
0.027 
(6.9) 
0.025 
(2.1) 
0.081 
(10.3) 
0.15 
(5.2) 
0.019 
(5.6) 
0.018 
(5.0) 
-0.0082 
(0.7) 
0.076 
(9.7) 
PFAGD
P(-1) 
     1.5 
(6.3) 
-0.011 
(3.2) 
-0.23 
(6.2) 
0.98 
(9.5) 
0.38 
(6.4) 
BANK
GDP(-
1) 
     0.5 
(3.5) 
0.91 
(43.0) 
0.53 
(27.4) 
0.057 
(0.9) 
0.047 
(1.3) 
R2 0.93 0.8 0.87 0.71 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.77 0.97 
COUNT
RIES 
37 71 65 66 37 35 68 62 63 35 
OBS 395 2468 2160 1246 419 365 1937 1684 1069 380 
Key: SIZE: loans plus bonds plus equities as a share of GDP, LOANS, loans as a share of GDP, M3, ratio of M3 to GDP, 
EQUITIES, ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP, BONDS, bond market capitalisation to GDP, GDPPC: Real GDP per 
capita, OPEN, average of the export and import-GDP ratios, URBAN: urbanisation ratio, 20-39 share of 20-39 age group in 
total population, 40-64 share of 40-64 age group in total population, 65 + share of age group over 65 in total population, 
BANKGDP, ratio of bank credit to GDP, PFAGDP, ratio of pension fund assets to GDP 
 
Table 4B: Robustness check using 5-year averages and lags 
 
% of GDP 
(5 year averages) 
Size Loans M3 Equities Bonds 
GDPPC (-5) 0.00004 
(2.5) 
0.00002 
(13.5) 
0.000004 
(3.0) 
-0.00002 
(3.6) 
-0.000003 
(0.7) 
INFLATION (-5) -0.00002 
(0.3) 
-0.00001 
(0.9) 
-0.00001 
(2.0) 
-0.00002 
(0.7) 
-0.000008 
(0.6) 
URBAN (-5) 0.082 
(7.4) 
0.00041 
(0.5) 
0.0032 
(5.4) 
0.00007 
(0.1) 
-0.0015 
(0.5) 
OPEN (-5) 0.007 
(1.8) 
0.0086 
(13.1) 
0.0053 
(12.0) 
0.016 
(12.1) 
-0.00044 
(0.4) 
20-39 (-5) -0.13 
(5.8) 
0.0032 
(1.6) 
0.0035 
(2.6) 
0.007 
(1.2) 
-0.00056 
(0.1) 
40-64 (-5) -0.04 
(1.3) 
0.029 
(10.3) 
0.034 
(17.9) 
0.086 
(9.8) 
0.019 
(2.5) 
65 + (-5) 0.19 
(5.0) 
0.026 
(5.1) 
0.025 
(6.0) 
0.077 
(6.3) 
0.089 
(9.8) 
R2 0.98 0.85 0.9 0.83 0.99 
COUNTRIES 35 71 65 65 35 
OBS 236 2092 1748 963 272 
Key, see Table 4A 
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Table 5: Demographic effects on financial structure (size variables) – subsets of countries 
 
 EME COUNTRIES OECD COUNTRIES 
 Size Loan M3 Equity Bond Size Loan M3 Equity Bond 
GDPPC 0.11 
(2.7) 
0.021 
(6.1) 
0.012 
(5.2) 
0.041 
(5.1) 
-0.023 
(3.1) 
0.1 
(5.2) 
0.018 
(8.8) 
0.006 
(3.2) 
-0.014 
(2.3) 
-0.00001 
(0.1) 
INFLATION 0.025 
(2.6) 
0.0028 
(2.4) 
0.00025 
(0.3) 
-0.0023 
(0.9) 
-0.0055 
(3.0) 
-0.036 
(3.8) 
0.05 
(0.4) 
-0.072 
(1.0) 
-1.7 
(3.2) 
-1.1 
(4.1) 
URBAN 0.07 
(2.9) 
0.00074 
(0.7) 
0.0021 
(3.0) 
0.0053 
(1.6) 
0.0092 
(2.1) 
0.036 
(2.6) 
-0.0075 
(3.6) 
-0.0015 
(1.7) 
-0.0059 
(1.1) 
-0.009 
(2.1) 
OPEN -0.004 
(0.9) 
0.0067 
(9.4) 
0.0053 
(11.5) 
0.0095 
(7.7) 
0.0024 
(2.8) 
0.0065 
(0.9) 
0.0025 
(1.9) 
-0.0011 
(0.9) 
0.011 
(3.0) 
-0.005 
(2.5) 
20-39 -0.08 
(1.9) 
0.019 
(6.9) 
0.0093 
(5.1) 
0.0018 
(0.3) 
-0.017 
(2.2) 
-0.17 
(4.2) 
0.002 
(0.5) 
-0.012 
(4.3) 
-0.0012 
(1.0) 
-0.0027 
(0.2) 
40-64 -0.17 
(2.8) 
-0.0068 
(1.8) 
0.01 
(4.1) 
0.015 
(1.8) 
-0.004 
(0.4) 
-0.077 
(1.1) 
0.045 
(8.5) 
0.024 
(7.1) 
0.14 
(8.6) 
0.041 
(2.1) 
65 +  0.61 
(3.8) 
0.041 
(4.9) 
0.037 
(6.6) 
0.023 
(0.9) 
0.13 
(4.4) 
0.092 
(2.8) 
0.049 
(8.0) 
0.034 
(6.8) 
-0.018 
(1.1) 
0.069 
(6.8) 
R2 0.93 0.68 0.83 0.79 0.91 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.66 0.95 
COUNTRIES 15 48 48 43 15 20 22 16 22 20 
OBS 160 1560 1562 714 167 227 900 590 524 244 
Key, see Table 4 
 
Table 6: Estimates of demographic effects on financial structure (ratio variables) – all countries 
 
 All countries All countries with financial development 
variables 
Percent Loan 
Equity 
Loan 
Security 
Debt 
Equity 
Loan 
Equity 
Loan 
Security 
Debt 
Equity 
GDPPC -0.0033 
(2.3) 
-0.0008 
(0.3) 
-0.4 
(1.6) 
-0.0069 
(3.7) 
0.011 
(0.4) 
-0.47 
(1.4) 
INFLATION 0.0054 
(4.7) 
0.086 
(5.3) 
0.25 
(1.4) 
0.0043 
(3.9) 
0.062 
(4.8) 
0.13 
(0.7) 
URBAN -0.0052 
(5.0) 
-0.031 
(1.5) 
-0.21 
(0.9) 
-0.0041 
(3.5) 
-0.052 
(2.1) 
-0.46 
(1.6) 
OPEN -0.0018 
(3.4) 
-0.028 
(4.5) 
-0.38 
(5.4) 
-0.0029 
(5.1) 
-0.033 
(5.2) 
-0.42 
(5.6) 
20-39 -0.0046 
(2.1) 
0.018 
(0.4) 
1.0 
(2.2) 
-0.0067 
(2.8) 
0.012 
(0.3) 
1.23 
(2.7) 
40-64 -0.016 
(6.0) 
0.032 
(0.7) 
1.6 
(3.3) 
-0.017 
(5.6) 
-0.028 
(0.6) 
1.61 
(2.7) 
65 +  -0.011 
(2.6) 
-0.055 
(1.0) 
-0.61 
(1.0) 
-0.0077 
(1.7) 
-0.056 
(1.0) 
-0.45 
(0.7) 
PFAGDP 
(-1) 
   -0.172 
(4.5) 
-0.27 
(0.6) 
2.25 
(0.4) 
BANKGDP 
(-1) 
   -0.178 
(7.7) 
0.99 
(3.5) 
5.6 
(1.7) 
R2 0.71 0.61 0.41 0.73 0.63 0.41 
COUNTRIES 67 36 36 63 35 35 
OBS 1219 395 395 1059 365 365 
Key, see Table 4, also LOAN/EQUITY, ratio of loans to stock market capitalisation, LOAN/SECURITY, ratio of 
loans to bonds plus equities, DEBT/EQUITY, ratio of loans plus bonds to equity 
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Table 7: Demographic effects on financial structure (ratio variables) – subsets of countries 
 
 EME COUNTRIES OECD COUNTRIES 
 Loan 
Equity 
Loan 
Security 
Debt 
Equity 
Loan 
Equity 
Loan 
Security 
Debt 
Equity 
GDPPC -0.00021 
(0.4) 
-0.025 
(0.2) 
-0.35 
(0.3) 
-0.0007 
(0.5) 
-0.009 
(0.7) 
-0.39 
(2.5) 
INFLATION 0.0054 
(4.3) 
0.071 
(2.9) 
0.27 
(1.0) 
0.44 
(3.2) 
0.027 
(4.5) 
20.0 
(2.7) 
URBAN -0.0073 
(4.5) 
-0.137 
(2.2) 
0.13 
(0.2) 
0.0003 
(0.2) 
0.012 
(1.4) 
-0.095 
(0.8) 
OPEN -0.0015 
(2.3) 
-0.028 
(2.4) 
-0.54 
(4.1) 
-0.003 
(3.2) 
-0.018 
(4.1) 
-0.14 
(2.7) 
20-39 -0.0071 
(2.0) 
0.17 
(1.6) 
2.6 
(2.1) 
-0.0004 
(0.1) 
0.016 
(0.6) 
0.027 
(0.1) 
40-64 0.0011 
(0.2) 
0.43 
(2.8) 
4.2 
(2.4) 
-0.029 
(7.0) 
-0.029 
(0.7) 
0.1 
(0.2) 
65 +  -0.05 
(4.0) 
-1.1 
(2.6) 
-7.3 
(1.6) 
-0.0007 
(0.2) 
-0.011 
(0.5) 
-0.22 
(0.9) 
R2 0.69 0.57 0.33 0.78 0.83 0.77 
COUNTRIES 44 15 15 22 20 22 
OBS 696 160 160 515 227 227 
Key, see Tables 4 and 6 
 
Table 8: Estimates of demographic effects on financial structure (flow variables) 
 
 Private Saving/GDP External Balance/GDP 
 ALL1 ALL2  EME OECD ALL1 ALL2  EME OECD 
GDPPC 0.0006 
(0.8) 
0.00075 
(0.8) 
0.0068 
(3.8) 
-0.00023 
(0.5) 
0.3 
(9.5) 
0.24 
(4.9) 
0.14 
(1.7) 
0.24 
(7.5) 
GROWTHPC 0.0008 
(2.8) 
0.0006 
(2.0) 
0.00031 
(0.8) 
0.0026 
(6.9) 
-0.059 
(2.9) 
-0.056 
(2.4) 
-0.09 
(3.6) 
0.09 
(2.1) 
INFLATION 0.00043 
(1.5) 
0.0001 
(0.3) 
0.00046 
(1.3) 
0.063 
(3.1) 
0.028 
(1.0) 
0.03 
(1.1) 
0.023 
(0.7) 
-0.074 
(3.8) 
URBAN -0.00095 
(2.4) 
-0.00067 
(1.3) 
-0.0015 
(2.6) 
0.0005 
(1.1) 
0.021 
(1.1) 
-0.0026 
(0.1) 
0.039 
(1.5) 
-0.014 
(0.5) 
OPEN 0.001 
(4.4) 
0.0019 
(6.2) 
0.00072 
(2.3) 
0.0015 
(4.9) 
0.019 
(1.4) 
0.013 
(0.7) 
-0.011 
(0.7) 
0.15 
(7.2) 
20-39 0.0045 
(5.5) 
0.0023 
(2.2) 
0.0052 
(3.5) 
0.00064 
(0.8) 
0.0033 
(0.1) 
0.045 
(0.8) 
-0.0047 
(0.1) 
-0.048 
(0.7) 
40-64 0.0067 
(4.9) 
0.0048 
(2.6) 
0.0094 
(3.7) 
0.0019 
(1.6) 
0.021 
(3.5) 
0.029 
(3.4) 
0.37 
(3.8) 
0.056 
(0.6) 
65 +  -0.011 
(5.3) 
-0.0079 
(3.3) 
-0.022 
(4.4) 
-0.0046 
(3.5) 
-0.59 
(5.8) 
-0.35 
(2.8) 
-0.63 
(3.2) 
-0.41 
(4.3) 
PFAGDP 
(-1) 
 0.021 
(0.9) 
   -0.22 
(0.2) 
  
BANKGDP 
(-1) 
 -0.031 
(2.5) 
   -1.65 
(2.1) 
  
R2 0.6 0.62 0.53 0.76 0.57 0.6 0.56 0.55 
COUNTRIES 59 53 35 22 71 68 48 22 
OBS 1398 1103 830 560 2600 1950 1663 928 
Key, see Table 4, GROWTHPC annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
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APPENDIX 
 
List of countries utilised in econometrics: 
 
Emerging market 
economies 
Transition economies Advanced countries 
Algeria Bulgaria Australia 
Argentina China Austria 
Bolivia Croatia Belgium 
Brazil Czech Republic Canada 
Chile Hungary Denmark 
Colombia Kazakhstan Finland 
Costa Rica Latvia France 
Dominican Republic Poland Germany 
Ecuador Romania Greece 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Russian Federation Iceland 
El Salvador Slovak Republic Ireland 
Fiji Ukraine Italy 
Honduras Vietnam Japan 
Hong Kong, China  Luxembourg 
India  Netherlands 
Indonesia  New Zealand 
Israel  Norway 
Jordan  Portugal 
Korea, Rep.  Spain 
Malaysia  Sweden 
Mexico  Switzerland 
Morocco  United Kingdom 
Nigeria  United States 
Pakistan   
Panama   
Paraguay   
Peru   
Philippines   
Singapore   
South Africa   
Sri Lanka   
Thailand   
Tunisia   
Turkey   
Uruguay   
Venezuela, RB   
 
